A Revolution Where a Common Enemy is No Longer Enough: From Military Alliance to Political Integration
By Linn Thit (MA)
In Myanmar’s Spring Revolution, the cooperation between Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs) and the National Unity Government (NUG) forces has emerged as a primary strength, exerting significant military pressure on the military council. In particular, "Operation 1027" by the Three Brotherhood Alliance can be identified as a crucial turning point that shook the junta’s military grip.
However, recent territorial disputes and conflicts between the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) have re-exposed the structural challenges embedded within the Spring Revolution. This situation should not be viewed merely as a territorial dispute between two allies. Geopolitical analysis and political theory suggest it is a phenomenon that demonstrates the natural limitations of military alliances built solely on the basis of having a common enemy.
The Politics of Convenience and Alliances
In international politics, forces facing a common enemy often form an "alliance of convenience" based on short-term interests. In these types of alliances, organizations cooperate primarily to face a common foe, focus on immediate military interests, and engage in temporary collaboration.
However, if there is no shared political goal or institutional integration among the groups, individual interests tend to resurface as the enemy weakens or as military objectives are achieved. Consequently, competition over territorial control, resources, and authority can emerge following military success. In political theory, this phenomenon is known as "post-victory fragmentation."
Command Structure and the Security Dilemma
One crucial factor determining the sustainability of military cooperation is the command structure. In the absence of a unified chain of command, joint operations may achieve some success, but conflicts are likely to arise in the long run. This happens because every armed group naturally prioritizes its own security, territorial interests, and authority.
In political theory, this state of affairs is called a "security dilemma." When one group perceives the military movements of another as a potential threat, mutual suspicion and military tensions arise. This condition erodes trust and weakens the overall alliance structure.
Strategic Challenges for the Spring Revolution
While current alliance structures can pressure the military council, they also create strategic challenges for the long term. The National Unity Government (NUG) is increasingly engaging with ethnic armed groups, local People's Defense Forces (PDFs), and new coalitions. This includes alliances like the Spring Revolution Alliance (SRA), which was formed by 19 revolutionary groups in 2025.
While such structures can strengthen military coordination, they also increase the number of forces operating under different command structures. If there is no common agreement on political policy, power-sharing, and the future political system, competition for power and territory may emerge once military success is achieved.
Geopolitical Lessons from International History
International history shows that alliances based only on a common enemy can achieve temporary success, but new conflicts often emerge post-victory without political integration. For example, after the Soviet-Afghan War, Mujahideen groups achieved military success as Soviet troops withdrew, but they lacked a political agreement among themselves. This led to power struggles and eventually the Afghan Civil War, which later allowed for the emergence of new forces like the Taliban.
A similar phenomenon occurred during the Syrian Civil War. Groups opposing the Bashar al-Assad government initially cooperated due to a common enemy, but battles later broke out between them because of differences in ideology, political goals, and territorial interests. These experiences prove that military success alone cannot guarantee political stability.
Conclusion
In Myanmar’s Spring Revolution, alliance coalitions are a vital force for military success, yet alliances built solely on having a common enemy may not be sufficient for long-term political stability. The issues between the TNLA and MNDAA, along with lessons from Afghanistan and Syria, point to a single truth: military success is not the end of a revolution, but only the beginning of building a new political system.
Therefore, the crucial strategic challenge for today’s revolutionary forces is to develop a common political vision, shared institutions, and a unified administrative system while continuing to build military alliances. If the question of how power will be exercised after victory remains unsolved, the revolution faces the risk of escaping one dictatorship only to fall into new, unstable conflicts.
Note: This article is selected, edited, and presented as a feature to strengthen the revolution and encourage diverse perspectives among the public. The views expressed are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the position of People's Goal. We welcome comments and further discussion.