“Further Consolidation Is the Key”: Comrade Aung San Shar on Uniting Revolutionary Forces
At the panel discussion “Achieving Victory Through Alliances: Challenges and Opportunities,” held as part of the Thought Progress Program and co organized by People’s Goal and People’s Spring, Comrade Aung San Shar, Chief of Operations of the PDF Special Operations Command, shared his perspective on the future of cooperation among revolutionary forces.
His remarks focused on a central theme: further consolidation among armed revolutionary groups is essential for achieving decisive progress against the military junta.
“Further consolidation is the key. These groups that have joined forces are certainly the ones that have fought selflessly on the ground.”
Consolidation as a Strategic Priority
According to Comrade Aung San Shar, the formation of the Spring Revolution Alliance (SRA) is a significant and positive development for the revolutionary movement.
The SRA brings together a number of armed groups that emerged during the Spring Revolution but were not formally under the command of the National Unity Government’s Ministry of Defense (NUG MOD). While these groups operate independently, many of them have already fought alongside other revolutionary forces on the ground.
He noted that the NUG MOD itself was formed through a similar process of consolidation.
Independent resistance groups from across the country gradually came together under a shared command structure to form the MOD’s People’s Defense Forces (PDF). This process required extensive negotiation, coordination, and trust building among different groups.
The formation of the SRA reflects a similar effort to unite revolutionary forces that remain outside the MOD’s command.
“Achieving this kind of consolidation is extremely difficult,” he explained, noting that those who worked to bring these groups together understand how complex the process can be.
Overcoming Organizational Differences
One of the main challenges to unity lies in the need for groups to move beyond their individual interests and institutional boundaries.
For genuine consolidation to occur, Comrade Aung San Shar emphasized that revolutionary forces must be willing to set aside questions of authority, jurisdiction, and organizational prestige.
For him, unity does not necessarily require all forces to operate under a single command structure.
Groups may operate under the NUG MOD, the SRA, or under the leadership of Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs). What matters most is that forces unite decisively and coordinate their actions.
“If we can come together without focusing on individual interests or demands, we will be able to overcome the challenges and achieve further consolidation,” he said.
He also expressed hope that additional armed groups that have not yet joined alliances will eventually participate in broader unification efforts.
Building Cooperation Rather Than Competition
The emergence of the SRA does not necessarily create competition with the NUG MOD, according to Comrade Aung San Shar.
Instead, he believes the existence of multiple alliances can strengthen the overall revolutionary movement if they cooperate effectively.
“There is no need for rivalry between us,” he said. “The stronger each force becomes, the better it is for the revolution.”
Currently, the Spring Revolution includes three major blocs of armed forces:
Forces under the NUG MOD
Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs)
Alliances such as the SRA
If these forces are able to cooperate strategically, they could eventually establish a nationwide unified military command.
However, building such coordination requires time and careful organizational development. Like the MOD PDFs, the SRA will need to strengthen its internal command structures, develop shared rules and codes of conduct, and integrate its various units into a functional chain of command.
The Importance of Joint Command Structures
For larger military operations to succeed, Comrade Aung San Shar emphasized the importance of joint command systems between revolutionary forces.
In northern Myanmar, for example, the NUG MOD and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) have already established strong operational coordination through joint command structures.
Similarly, in southern regions, alliances between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNPP) have developed coordinated command mechanisms.
If the SRA can join and participate in similar joint command arrangements, he believes revolutionary forces will be able to operate more effectively as a unified front.
“The NUG MOD alone cannot overthrow the military junta,” he said. “The EROs alone cannot do it either. Everyone must work together.”
Resisting Divide and Rule Tactics
The military junta has historically relied on divide and rule strategies to weaken opposition forces. However, Comrade Aung San Shar believes that this tactic is becoming less effective.
Revolutionary forces across the country now have extensive experience working together on the battlefield, which has helped build strong relationships and trust among fighters.
Even when temporary ceasefires or tactical decisions create short term divisions, he believes the shared experience of fighting together makes it possible for alliances to quickly reform.
The experience of Operation 1027, where multiple revolutionary forces coordinated operations against the military, demonstrated the potential for joint military action.
These experiences have strengthened trust and cooperation among different armed organizations.
Preparing for Coordinated Offensives
Comrade Aung San Shar also shared updates on recent organizational developments within the NUG MOD.
One example is the creation of a Special Regional Command for the South, which consolidates multiple forces operating in areas such as Mon State, Bago Region, and parts of Karen State.
This restructuring aims to strengthen coordination and improve operational effectiveness.
Like the SRA, the MOD PDFs have also been working to consolidate scattered forces into unified regional commands. New battalions continue to be integrated into the structure as consolidation efforts expand.
In the early stages of the revolution, operations often focused on capturing individual military camps whenever opportunities arose. However, this approach is now evolving.
Revolutionary forces are increasingly focusing on larger coordinated offensives targeting strategic objectives.
Strategic Targets and Urban Operations
According to Comrade Aung San Shar, future operations will prioritize key strategic targets rather than attempting to capture every military base across the country.
The military junta maintains fourteen regional military commands, but targeting a small number of critical centers could have a decisive impact.
He suggested that strategic objectives may include locations such as Yangon, Naypyidaw, and Mandalay, along with important military infrastructure such as airbases and weapons factories.
Revolutionary forces have already gained significant control in many rural areas, particularly in parts of Karen and Mon states. The next stage of the conflict may involve greater efforts to reclaim urban areas.
“Our main objective is to take back our cities,” he said.
Strengths and Remaining Challenges
After nearly five years of resistance, Comrade Aung San Shar believes that the combined manpower of revolutionary forces now exceeds that of the military junta.
However, significant challenges remain.
The most critical limitation is the supply of weapons and ammunition. While some groups have sufficient resources, others face severe shortages.
For effective combined operations, he stressed the importance of resource sharing among allied forces.
Groups with greater access to weapons and ammunition must support those with fewer resources in order to strengthen the overall alliance.
Toward a Decisive Turning Point
Ultimately, Comrade Aung San Shar argued that success will depend on the ability of revolutionary forces to act collectively rather than pursuing separate territorial objectives.
For example, instead of each group focusing only on its own region, all forces must be willing to concentrate their efforts on key strategic targets when necessary.
“If we identify Naypyidaw as the strategic objective, then everyone must converge and attack Naypyidaw together,” he said.
Only through coordinated nationwide operations targeting the military junta’s critical strongholds and support structures can the revolution reach a decisive turning point.
This article summarizes insights shared by Comrade Aung San Shar, Chief of Operations of the PDF Special Operations Command, during the panel discussion “Achieving Victory Through Alliances: Challenges and Opportunities,” held as part of the Thought Progress Program and co organized by People’s Goal and People’s Spring.